# **Automated Software Reliability**

#### George Candea

School of Computer & Communication Sciences EPFL (Lausanne, Switzerland)



# We are forced to take the reliability of software on faith

RTL8029.SYS



#### **Faith-based Industry**

- Programmers write code, then mostly hope for the best
- Users trust software providers to test the code thoroughly
- Cannot assess the reliability of a software system before using it

#### Systems vs. Programs


- We know how to build small things that work well
- But a real-world system is ...
  - complex millions of lines of code (MLOC)
  - written by 100s of programmers in many languages
  - many threads running in parallel
  - implicit, vague specifications

#### Systems vs. Programs

- We know how to build small things that work well
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  - many threads running in parallel
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#### **Bug-free programs # Bug-free systems**





#### **Automation**

Tools & Systems

Automated Testing	Automated Debugging	Automated Correcting	Scalable Certification
DDT Test proprietary code	ESD Execution synthesis		iProve End-user verifiability
	Portend Date race classifier		iQA Rating & certification
ConfErr & WebErr Human error testing			

Core Techs Cloud9 - Cluster-based parallel symbolic execution

S<sup>2</sup>E - Selective symbolic execution of full software stacks

#### **Outline**

- 1. The S<sup>2</sup>E Platform
  - Background
  - S<sup>2</sup>E: The Theory
  - S<sup>2</sup>E: The System
- 2. Three Use Cases
- 3. Automated Software Reliability Services (AutoSRS)

S<sup>2</sup>E = platform for building

analysis tools that are

multi-path and

in-vivo

# **Bug Finding**

```
$ ./prog
int main(argc, argv)

{
  if (argc == 2)
    printf("%c", *argv[2]);

    printf("OK");
}

$ ./prog ABC
Segmentation fault

$ valgrind ./prog ABC
Invalid read of size 1
main (prog.c:4)
```

#### Other Examples

- Security analysis
- Program verification
- Performance profiling


• ...

Analysis = check properties of execution paths

# **Multi-Path Analysis**

```
int main(argc, argv)
{
  if (argc == 2)
    printf("%c", *argv[2]);

  printf("OK");
}
```



#### Simultaneously analyze multiple paths

# **In-Vivo Analysis**



In Vitro



In Vivo

#### **In-Vivo Analysis**




In Vitro





**Analyze entire software stack** 


#### Single-Path In-Vitro











S<sup>2</sup>E platform = path exploration + path analysis

#### **Challenge: Path Explosion**


- Cannot analyze all paths ⇒ select only some
  - which paths you choose can make a big difference
  - S<sup>2</sup>E enables making this choice *analysis-specific*

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#### Unit vs. Environment

```
int main(argc, argv)
{
    if (argc == 0) {
        ...
    }
    p = malloc(...);
    if (p == NULL) {
        ...
    }
}
```



#### Unit vs. Environment

```
Program
                                              Other progs
int main(argc, argv)
  if (argc == 0) {
                                         Libraries
                                         OS Kernel
   = malloc(...);
    (p == NULL) {
                                         Hardware
                         Input
```

## **Thorough Automated Testing**



```
int main(argc, argv) {
   if (argc == 0) {
        ...
   }
   p = malloc(...);
   if (p == NULL) {
        ...
   }
   ...
}
Unit
```

## **Thorough Automated Testing**




```
int main(argc, argv) {
   if (argc == 0) {
        ...
   }
   p = malloc(...);
   if (p == NULL) {
        ...
   }
        Unit
```

#### **Thorough Automated Testing**




Zero false negatives Zero false positives

```
int main(argc, argv) {
   if (argc == 0) {
        ...
   }
   p = malloc(...);
   if (p == NULL) {
        ...
   }
   ...
}
Unit
```



**Key Observation** 

```
int main(argc, argv)
{
   if (argc == 0) {
        ...
   }
   p = malloc(...);
   if (p == NULL) {
        ...
   }
}
```




Provide illusion of full-system analysis

Input

#### **Consistent Execution**

- Path selection must be done carefully...
  - preserve illusion of full-system analysis
  - unit/environment interaction must be realistic
  - preserve efficiency (explore minimum # of paths necessary)



#### **Examples of Inconsistency**

- Allow some paths to clobber other paths' state
  - happens when environment changes are not isolated
  - occurs in test generation systems (DART, EXE, ...)
- Use models of the environment
  - models (by definition) exhibit behavioral differences
  - model checkers, symbolic exec engines (SLAM, KLEE, ...)

#### In S<sup>2</sup>E, each path has its own real environment

## **Execution Consistency Models**

- Execution Consistency Model = set of paths
  - i.e., abstract specification of which paths to analyze
  - i.e., grammar describing the paths of interest
- Execution is consistent iff its path belongs to ECM set
- Not the same as memory consistency models
  - but similar in spirit

# SC-UE (SC Unit-level Exec)

Much fewer paths False negatives?


```
int main(argc, argv) {
  if (argc == 1) {
  if (p == NULL)
                    Unit
                                                   Environment
```

# Relaxed Consistency (RC)

```
Unit Input
int main(argc, argv) {
    (argc == 1) {
     (p == NULL) {
                    Unit
                                                  Environment
```


# Relaxed Consistency (RC)

No false negatives



# Relaxed Consistency (RC)

No false negatives False positives ?




# **Local Consistency (LC)**


#### **Unit Input**


```
int main(argc, argv) {
   if (argc == 1) {
        ...
   }
   p = malloc(...);
   ...
}
Unit
```


Interface annotation


 $malloc() \rightarrow \{p,NULL\}$ 











#### Mix & Match

- ECM = specification of paths to be explored
  - S2E underneath the covers explores the requested paths
- Can make principled trade-offs
  - FPs vs. FNs vs. exploration+analysis performance
- Minimize the number of explored paths
  - all the paths in the ECM set, but none extra


#### Can implement any exec. consistency model

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
#### Symbolic Execution

```
int func(int x, int y)
{
    if (x < 0) {
        ...
    }
    if (y > 0) {
        ...
    }
}
```



### **Concrete** → **Symbolic**

```
int main(argc, argv) {
  if (argc == 0) {
 p = malloc(...);
  if (p == NULL) {
```



### Symbolic → Concrete

```
int main(argc, argv) {
    if (argc == 0) {
        ...
}

p = malloc(...);

Environment

if (p == NULL) {
        ...
}
    ...
}
```

### Symbolic → Concrete

```
Unit
int main(argc, argv) {
  if (argc == 0) {
                                                     Environment
 p = malloc(...);
     (p == NULL) {
```

### Symbolic → Concrete

```
int main(argc, argv) {
    if (argc == 0) {
        ...
    }


    p = malloc(...);

    Environment

    if (p == NULL) {
        ...
    }
    ...
}
```


### Selective Symbolic Execution


```
int main(argc, argv) {
  if (argc == 0) {
             128
 p = malloc(\delta);
  if (p == NULL) {
```




### Selective Symbolic Execution


```
int main(argc, argv) {
  if (argc == 0) {
             128
 p = malloc(\delta);
  if (p == NULL) {
```









Customized virtual machine




Runs unmodified x86 binaries (incl. proprietary/obfuscated/encrypted binaries)



Customized virtual machine




Runs unmodified x86 binaries (incl. proprietary/obfuscated/encrypted binaries)




Customized virtual machine

Selection done at runtime Most code runs "natively"



Runs unmodified x86 binaries (incl. proprietary/obfuscated/encrypted binaries)



Customized virtual machine

Selection done at runtime Most code runs "natively"

Shared concrete/symbolic state representation

buf Application

Libraries

Kernel

Block device driver

**Application** 

Libraries

Kernel

Block device driver

buf

**Application** 

Libraries

Kernel

Block device driver

buf *if (buf[0]==3) ...* 

**Application** 


Libraries

Kernel


Block device driver

buf (buf[0]=3)


#### **S2E User's View**




#### **S2E User's View**





# **Key S<sup>2</sup>E Feature**





**Execution weaves between symbolic/concrete** transparently, efficiently, and consistently











**SC-CE** 

Strictly consistent concrete execution

**SC-UE** 

Strictly consistent unit-level execution

**SC-SE** 

Strictly consistent system-level execution

Classic fuzzing (most real-world testing)

Dynamic symbolic & concolic execution engines (DART, EXE)

Symbolic execution engines with environment models (KLEE)

Most disassemblers

Automated reverse engineering (RevNIC)

Some automated testing tools (DDT)

RC-CC

CFG consistency

**RC-OC** 

Overapproximate consistency

LC

Local consistency

#### **Outline**

- 1. The S<sup>2</sup>E Platform
- 2. Three Use Cases
  - Finding bugs in proprietary software
    - Reverse engineering
    - Performance profiling
- 3. Automated Software Reliability Services

A problem has been detected and Windows has been shut down to prevent damage to your computer.

The problem seems to be caused by the following file: SPCMDCON.SYS

PAGE\_FAULT\_IN\_NONPAGED\_AREA

If this is the first time you've seen this Stop error screen, restart your computer. If this screen appears again, follow these steps:

Check to make sure any new hardware or software is properly installed. If this is a new installation, ask your hardware or software manufacturer for any Windows updates you might need.


If problems continue, disable or remove any newly installed hardware or software. Disable BIOS memory options such as caching or shadowing. If you need to use Safe Mode to remove or disable components, restart your computer, press F8 to select Advanced Startup Options, and then select Safe Mode.

Technical information:


\*\*\* STOP: 0x00000050 (0xFD3094C2,0x00000001,0xFBFE7617,0x00000000)

\*\*\* SPCMDCON.SYS - Address FBFE7617 base at FBFE5000, DateStamp 3d6dd67c

## **DDT**<sup>+</sup> Testing Tool



## **DDT**<sup>+</sup> Testing Tool



#### DDT+

Path exploration




- LC (local consistency) for OS/driver interface
- RC (relaxed consistency) for driver/HW interface
- Path Analysis
  - Off-the-shelf <u>single-path</u> checkers

- user-defined analyzers

  S<sup>2</sup>E stock analyzers
- Our own VM-level analyzers (incl. coverage counter)
- Results of analysis
  - find bugs ⇒ executable traces (inputs, instructions, ...)
  - traces prove presence of the bugs + help fix the bugs

#### Symbolic Hardware


- Symbolic HW inputs, symbolic interrupts, etc.
- Test without having the real hardware
- Test for bad hardware behaviors



Tested Driver	Bug Type
RTL8029	Resource leak
RTL8029	Memory corruption
RTL8029	Race condition
RTL8029	Segmentation fault
RTL8029	Segmentation fault
AMD PCNet	Resource leak
AMD PCNet	Resource leak
Ensoniq AudioPCI	Segmentation fault
Ensoniq AudioPCI	Segmentation fault
Ensoniq AudioPCI	Race condition
Ensoniq AudioPCI	Race condition
Intel Pro/1000	Memory leak
Intel Pro/100 (DDK)	Kernel crash
Intel 82801AA AC97	Race condition




## **Analysis Time < 20 minutes**




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
# RevNIC+ Reverse Engineering



## **Automated Porting**




## **PROFs: Performance Profiling**



- Apache URL parser
- Microsoft IIS SSL module
- Lua language interpreter
- Various utilities


129,086 instructions

## Multi-Path In-Vivo Profiling





## Multi-Path In-Vivo Profiling





## **S2E Improves Productivity**

PROF<sub>s</sub> 20 person-hours 767 lines of code

יוטטי 38 person-hours 720 lines of code

S2E Platform

> 100,000 lines of code 47,000 lines of new code

## S<sup>2</sup>E in a Nutshell

- Platform for building in-vivo multi-path analysis tools
- Selective symbolic execution of x86 binaries
- Execution consistency models




#### http://s2e.epfl.ch

Ready-for-use VM, demos, tutorials, source code, documentation

### **Outline**

- 1. The S<sup>2</sup>E Platform
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  - Testing of proprietary software
  - Reverse engineering
  - Performance profiling
- 3. Automated Software Reliability Services



#### January 12, 2011

- 107 trillion The number of emails sent on the Internet in 2010.
- 294 billion Average number of email messages per day.
- 1.88 billion The number of email users worldwide.
- 480 million New email users since the year before.
- 89.1% The share of emails that were spam.
- 262 billion The number of spam emails per day (assuming 89% are spam).
- 2.9 billion The number of email accounts worldwide.
- 25% Share of email accounts that are corporate.

#### 27% of humanity uses email

http://royal.pingdom.com/2011/01/12/internet-2010-in-numbe

#### Webmail Is ...

Easy to use

Accessible from anywhere +
Free

Used by billions of people

Recipe for miracles

## Replicate the Miracle?


- How do we get all the world's programmers to use the very best testing tools?
- How do we empower end users to demand better quality from the software they use?

Software reliability as a service


### **AutoSRS**

- 1. Testing service
- 2. Debugging service
- 3. End-user service
- 4. Certification/ranking service

1. Testing Service



## 2. Debugging Service






## 3. End-User Service



Internet Explorer











# 4. Certification/Rating Service

- Service for software consumers
  - evaluate software reliability automatically
  - publish results ⇒ enable product comparisons
  - explain & quantify software reliability to consumers
- No certification => liability for damages
  - do away with "AS IS" software licenses



Automated Debugging (Automated Correcting) Scalable Certification Automated Testing **iProve ESD DDT Dimmunix** Test proprietary code Execution synthesis Deadlock immunity End-user verifiability Systems LFI **Portend RevNIC iQA** Date race classifier Rating & certification Test recovery code Reverse engineering ConfErr & WebErr Human error testing Cloud9 - Cluster-based parallel symbolic execution Core Techs S<sup>2</sup>E - Selective symbolic execution of full software stacks

**AutoSRS** - Automated Software Reliability Services

http://dslab.epfl.ch